

RIDING THE MILK WAGON

The Effect of Money on the Outcomes of Legislative Races  
in Washington State, 1974-1982

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The Washington State Public Disclosure Commission has chosen to publish and disseminate this study of campaign financing pursuant to the Commission's statutory authority to publish reports that will promote the purposes of the public disclosure law. The Commission believes that Mr. Sell's study serves to enhance public understanding of the financing of political campaigns.

Reports filed with the Commission by candidates provided much of the basic data for this study, which is an excellent example of how this information can be used both to advance scholarly research and to promote greater public understanding of the political processes.

## Abstract

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between electoral success in legislative campaigns and money. Other potential contributing factors also were considered. Questions to be answered included what are the most important factors in determining the outcomes of legislative campaigns; how might campaign strategies be altered to take advantage of this new information; and how should the public/government respond to campaign spending.

The method of the study was to examine existing research in this area and to take statistical measurements of data from Washington state legislative elections. More than 500 cases from 1974-82 were compared. Percentages of the vote received by candidates in general elections were measured in relationship to actual and percentages of spending, actual and percentages of contributions, political orientations of districts, and experience levels of the winning and losing candidates. The basic measurement tool was the multiple regression, producing numbers that explained the variations in percentages of vote received by candidates. Election statistics were gathered from Public Disclosure Commission and Washington Secretary of State reports.

The findings of this effort were that relative percentage of spending, measured as percentage of money or as percentage of contributions, is the most important measurable factor in predicting the outcome of legislative campaigns, both in House and in Senate races. Legislative candidates thus could expect more success if they spent more time working their districts for a greater number of contributions, because giving money appears to encourage people to also contribute to campaigns in other ways.

Limits on campaign spending, however, are to be viewed with caution. The fact that they are difficult to enforce notwithstanding, those restraints that are likely to be held constitutional by state and federal courts appear unlikely to limit the actual amount of money spent on campaigns, though they may have some success in increasing the number of people who give money to campaigns.

The study concludes that party campaign strategies are not rationally constructed, either by the standards of this research or by the standards of the wisdom most commonly applied by political professionals. Because of money's definite ability to influence electoral outcomes, political finance cannot be allowed to operate unfettered. Whether direct limitations would actually help in this regard is somewhat doubtful and certainly unclear. Good government might better be served by making the Public Disclosure Commission stronger, i.e., making the disclosure more public and requiring some type of audits for campaigns.

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Credit also is due to the men and women who serve in the Washington State Legislature and the many staff people who serve them. Many of you provided invaluable insight into this portion of the political process, intentionally and otherwise.

"Politics has got to be expensive. . .it takes a lot of money to get beat."

--Will Rogers

"Three things are needed in elections. The first is money. The second is money. The third is money."

--Joseph P. Kennedy Sr.

"Democracy is considered to be the most expensive form of government known to mankind and part of the democratic process is elections."

--Beatrice Kay

"Thanks for sending me that 40-page piece of garbage titled 'Their Money's Worth' by T.M. Sell, obviously a student."

--C. Montgomery Johnson

"Money is the mother's milk of politics."

--Jesse Unruh

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## I. Campaign Spending: An Introduction

Washington state made political history in 1972 when the voters overwhelmingly approved Initiative 276. Suddenly candidates for public office had to say how much they were spending on campaigns and from where they were getting the money. Politics has never been the same; the battle of the bucks had been convened.

But the revolution was limited. The state Supreme Court found the initiative's campaign spending limit to be unconstitutional by 1974 [1]. Expected backlashes against big spenders failed to materialize. Spending instead took life and scaled Cascadian heights like a happy hot air balloon. Aboard the gondola, the passengers have bickered while semi-consciously fueling the burner. Those who rely on money the most -- Republicans, business interests and many organizations, including unions -- argue that money is the great equalizer for those who lack other resources. Those who rely less on money and have other resources, such as bodies -- Democrats, unions (often the same ones) and the so-called citizens groups -- argue that exorbitant campaign spending gives the spender unfair advantage and opens government to corruption by allowing undue influence to those who have money to give.

Very few people would argue that some money isn't necessary to win any election above the level of flood district commissioner. How much is necessary is unclear. In fact, the connection between money and votes is only tenuously drawn by a handful of statistical stabs, aimed by a scattering of political scientists laboring chiefly unnoticed in the outhouses of academe. No test of any significance has been taken in Washington state. That is the aim of this paper: what is the effect of money on the outcomes of elections and, knowing that,

what policy, if any, should be pursued with regard to campaign financing?

The statistical sample for this research is drawn from Washington state legislative campaigns from 1974 to 1982, selected as indicated in section III. In support of this work, other research has been compared and many people intimately involved with political finance in Washington state have been interviewed.

This paper was written based on the premise that ideology is for the unimaginative. The author's intent is to add some illumination to the darkened room in which political knowledge is often kept, not to provide ammunition for any particular point of view.

#### 1. The Common Wisdom

If you open the door to the darkened room, the light from the hallway will let you see the common wisdom. This is kept in cabinets made of practical experience, though rarely are they reinforced with statistical research. This is not to denigrate practical experience, which has to be the foundation of any endeavor. Also, you cannot quantify a great many things, so that common wisdom in many instances is more precious than any number of microchips.

The common wisdom admits, for the most part, that money and politics are inextricably intertwined. A common theme is the need for challengers to spend more than incumbents do in order to win.[2] Beyond that, it is generally acknowledged that a candidate must spend enough to make her or his name, face and views known to the public. As one pundit put it: "You cannot buy an election so long as your opponent has enough money to make his or her case." [3]

Money is regarded as a necessary but not sufficient condition for electoral victory. An efficient organization and hard work also are rightly regarded as helpful in winning.[4] Political consultant Beatrice Kay characterized the necessary elements as "time, talent, manpower and money." [5] C. Montgomery Johnson, a Washington state campaign consultant, has declared incumbency the most important factor, followed by questions of image, name familiarity, organization, party and then money.[6]

Former Washington state House Chief Clerk Dean Foster listed political orientation of the legislative district as the most important factor in determining elections, followed by the quality of the candidate, the mood of the electorate, organization and money. House Republican caucus attorney and sometime staff director Allen Hayward listed incumbency, money, number of contributors.[7]

Incumbency is considered an advantage by most and for several reasons. What the incumbent does often is news, so that the incumbent gets plenty of what consultants like to call "earned media," news stories and the like. The four legislative caucuses in Washington state each have their own public information staffs to maximize this advantage. Incumbents in our state Legislature also receive considerable benefits in the way of staff support, for word processing, for meeting constituents' requests for help and information, plus access to mailing lists and liberal printing and postal allowances. Like most of political life, the incumbent sword cuts both ways: while much of this work and money helps keep incumbents in office, it also helps meet constituent needs and provides information to many

communities that otherwise would receive very little.

If the incumbent is paying any attention to his or her job, she or he has a great advantage, particularly at campaign time, in terms of information. The incumbent, blessed with the knowledge of experience, will sound like a legislator. Sounding like he or she belongs in Olympia is very difficult for a challenger; the observer will notice a marked difference in the challenger's speech after his or her first trip to campaign school. The net result of these advantages is that the incumbent's name and, perhaps, reputation will be much more familiar to the average voter in her or his district. Because voters may cast their ballots as much as 70 percent of the time based on name familiarity,[8] the incumbent can start the race many steps ahead of the challenger.

A candidate cannot control for incumbency (other than by winning). A candidate also cannot control for district orientation. Because voters are not required to register by party in Washington state, this is a very difficult thing to measure. We also have experienced three major redistricting efforts in the past two decades, further confusing the issue. What we have is a sort of rough agreement among political operatives as to which districts are predominately Republican, which are predominately Democrat and which are swing. The difference this makes is relatively simple: a candidate of one party will have a much better chance in a district in which a majority of the voters also lean toward that party.

## 2. Questions of Strategy

As befits a necessary but insufficient condition, you can do a

lot of other things with money. Without directly saying it, the experts assign great potential to money. Once you win the first time, you are an incumbent. Party strength is about the only thing you cannot rapidly influence with money, but even that can be accounted for by the clever candidate. Many electorally successful legislators spend considerable time and effort (and money) developing a home-front image of being a reasonable person. Following this, reporters and constituents can say "He's a Republican (or a Democrat), but he's not crazy like some of those guys."

Conceivably, money can help alleviate problems of time and manpower in addition to problems of image.[9] If nothing else, you can afford to hire someone like Johnson.

While the common wisdom professes the importance of how money is spent, surprisingly little seems to be concretely known about what is the best way to spend it. Consultants seem to have a great many plausible ideas that pertain to specific electoral situations. Billboards are good basically for establishing name identification, for example, and television and radio are important in rural, geographically spread districts. No hard and fast rules are to be found in this area, however, but the political consultants appear unanimous in their estimation that a well-run campaign can beat a better financed one. But what they all seem to miss is that their Davidian candidates all slew Goliath with at least some money in the sling. C. Montgomery Johnson has gone so far as to say it is possible to win an election with no money, but it is hard to imagine him recommending this strategy to any of his clients.[10]

The only element that cannot be influenced, it appears, is the personal quality of the candidate. A quality candidate, a bright, articulate, well-dressed, well-known and respected individual, makes any campaign easier to win. But when you can affect nearly all the other variables with money, is a quality candidate necessary? Not every quality candidate gets money and a lot who are of less quality get plenty of money.[11] Sometimes this is because the district is too heavily Democrat or Republican to warrant a serious expenditure by the other party. Sometimes this is because party leadership doesn't like the candidate for ideological or personal reasons. The King County Republican organization, in recent years, has been notorious for paying less attention to moderate candidates regardless of their quality; Democrats have been known to err in similar fashion.

The Public Disclosure Commission, in its 1984 monograph on the growth of campaign spending, took a sampling of 15 House and nine Senate races.[12] The PDC found that candidates spent the bulk of their funds on printing (24.7 percent of the total), postage (17.7 percent) advertising (17.1 percent) and radio and television advertising (11.8) percent. Among the categories, newspaper advertising dropped from 22.5 percent in 1972 to 14.5 percent in 1982, though the amount in actual dollars actually rose. Although they make up a small part of the total, items such as consultant services, labels and lists, telephone costs and surveys rose the most over this time. This is not to suggest that a candidate will be successful simply by matching the averages displayed in the PDC survey. But it does suggest the existence of the conventional wisdom and it suggests the wisdom is

not static.

Foster has said Democrats expect to be outspent by Republicans and adjust their campaigns accordingly. They rely more on organization and more on the work of volunteers, while Republicans tend to rely more on such technical wizardry as computerized mailing. Though Republicans tend to be accused of it more often, both sides like to save a little money for a closing postal or media salvo in the waning moments of the battle. The efficacy of this tactic has not been measured, but a late "hit piece" always seems to scare the other side, if nothing else.[13]

The conventional wisdom pronounces that money matters, both by its presence and by how it is spent. "If we can't raise the money, we can't win," Hayward said. "If it really didn't make a difference how money is spent, there wouldn't be any jobs for political consultants." [14]

### 3. Political Angst in the Age of Richard Viguerie

The conventional wisdom lacks specific information and, in any case, it is difficult to acquire. This hasn't prevented anyone from getting exercised about demon money and its perfidious corruption of democratic democracy. In the last two years, nearly every daily newspaper in the state has devoted either news coverage or editorial bile to the subject of soaring campaign costs and, in the latter instance, to the need to reform the system accordingly.

The reform movement, in its effective phase, started in the 1960s, when reform was popular and social science as we think we know it took wing. In Washington state, enough public officials appeared to be for sale to arouse the citizenry to action. This culminated in the

passage of Initiative 276 in 1972 and the creation of the PDC in 1973.

The original legislation, as mentioned above, included campaign finance limitations until they were voided by the state Supreme Court. That left us knowing how much we give and spend for elections, which, for many people, didn't turn out to be enough. Although the relative fatness of campaign wallets is invariably an election issue, having a lot of money has not demonstrably kept anyone out of office.

Some, such as C. Montgomery Johnson, see campaign money as a necessary adjunct in the democratic process. This viewpoint carries some validity. In an age when districts comprise tens of thousands of people, mass communications is perhaps the only feasible way to bring the business of government to any significant portion of the electorate. (Much of the electorate still are a little weak on the particulars of government; ascribing the blame for this must be the subject for another paper.)

Others are not so benign in their analysis. Among those who favor campaign finance limits, money is almost automatically bad, as evidenced by Lucy Gaskill's 1979 analysis of special interest group (political action committee) behavior. Gaskill found that interest groups gave to incumbents more than four times as often as they gave to challengers and that most of the money went to "competitive races," those where the margin of victory was 10 percent or less.[15] Gaskill thus concluded that many races were rendered non-competitive because of the relative quantity of money being spent; therefore voters were being denied meaningful choices.[16]

Several other complaints also are raised. Large contributors are



seen to hold disproportionate influence over legislators; political action committees in particular are targeted for this transgression. [17] Common Cause lobbyist Chuck Sauvage, perhaps the state's leading advocate of campaign finance limitations, has argued that the preoccupation with raising and spending money has detracted from legislators' ability to deal with real issues or even pay attention to their districts. The high cost of PAC-fueled campaigns puts them out of reach of most citizens, Sauvage maintains, putting campaigns and government in the hands of special interests. The needs and desires of special interests don't always coincide with "the public interest," whatever that may be.[18] Two veteran legislators decided not to seek re-election in 1984 based in part on the large amounts of money they expected to have to raise for their campaigns.[19]

Some disagree that contributions buy influence or votes, though Sauvage claims a few legislators have privately told him this happens. Most of those who disagree are legislators and lobbyists, though admittedly they can hardly be expected to say anything else.[20]

The sheer size of the increase in spending can be somewhat frightening. Contributions to legislative races increased by 31 percent from 1974 to 1976, by 35 percent for 1978, by 52 percent for 1980, by 28 percent for 1982 and by a paltry 10 percent for 1984. The average number of contributors increased by only 16 percent, so that by 1984, PACs and party organizations were providing 42 percent of all campaign money in Washington state. The average cost of a legislative campaign increased 260 percent in those 10 years, somewhat more than inflation.[21] One statistic that seems to gall some people most is

that legislative candidates regularly spend upwards of \$30,000 for a job that pays, including benefits, about \$18,000 a year. We must assume the psychic income derived from belonging to the Gang of 147 makes up the difference.

If nothing else, we have no conclusive evidence that all this money has brought us any better government than we had 10 years ago. Given the many serious problems the state currently faces -- WPPSS, inadequate pension funding, a withering economy -- it may be worse. We are not getting, as it were, more bill for the buck.

#### 4. Whither the Magi?

If everyone believes money plays a significant role in the political process, we probably should be concerned about its effects. The actors involved will perform according to their perceptions regardless of how those perceptions are reflected by reality. But that does not deny the importance of knowing how much of a real difference money makes, particularly for campaign outcomes. How much money is necessary to win? Will spending largesse overcome other handicaps, such as running against an incumbent? If money has little or no effect, are campaign contributors investing wisely? If money is less important than we now seem to believe, should voters be so concerned over how much influence it buys? If it does not buy victory, its influence is overstated.

## II. Previous Endeavors

### 1. Domestic Ventures

Statistical research has been performed on a variety of elections, though not for Washington state. Still, the subject has not been ignored. Early reports include the two editions of Jolene Unsoeld's "Who Gave, Who Got, How Much?" (covering the 1974 and 1976 elections).[22] Although much acclaimed and worthy efforts, these reports are nothing more than lists of numbers. Virtually no analysis was included or attempted. The same can be said of Common Cause's 1974 compilation of campaign spending totals. It is an admirable collection of raw data (without which this report would have been more difficult). [23] Hugh Bone and Cindy Fey's "The People's Right to Know: An Analysis of the Washington State Public Disclosure Law," is an excellent study of the Public Disclosure Commission's performance up to 1978. The authors' first suggestion in the second appendix, "Further Research Questions," is instructive: "1. What is the correlation, if any, between expenditures for winners and losers. . . in the general elections?"[24]

Lucy Gaskill's 1979 study focused on interest group behavior and limited itself to the 1978 election results. Nonetheless, Gaskill discovered some interesting phenomena. PAC money appeared to gravitate toward tight races (where the margin of victory was 10 percent of the vote or less) and toward incumbents (by a more than four-to-one margin). She also cites two relatively early studies that found a high correlation between this measure of competitiveness and the average level of spending. Gaskill bemoans the "incumbency syndrome," an allegedly vicious circle in which incumbents raise money more easily,

thereby winning more easily and getting even more money.[25]

In February 1984 the PDC released the most analytic study of the subject, "The Increased Cost of Legislative Campaigns: 1974 to 1982." The report focuses chiefly on why spending has increased and what is being purchased for campaigns. It also provides purely correlative calculations on candidates, decisions and spending that draw some connections between winning and spending more. The report has no parallel for considering why spending has increased and for measuring what has been purchased. But it makes little use of advanced statistical techniques in determining what the effect of that spending might be. It also uses a rather curious sampling method, involving selection of districts scattered about the spending mean, chosen apparently without regard to the statistical validity of the resultant sample. For instance, some districts where incumbents typically do not face opposition were included in the study; such results seem likely to skew the results toward making money less important, even with the inclusion of primary opponents in lieu of general election opponents. [26]

## 2. Foreign Affairs

Later studies have not been as definite as Gaskill seems to be about the relationship between money and almost anything. Among those studies of which the author was able to locate copies, a variety of approaches and results are found. Interpretation of the data is further complicated by the variety of races considered (local to congressional) and by the fact that none of the studies considers any Washington state races. (Please see the Technical Appendix for a more

detailed discussion of the various methods and approaches used by social scientists in this area.)

Lott and Warner (1974) used congressional races from five states to find that party strength, as measured by voter registration, and incumbency were more important than money.[27]

W.P. Welch, an economist, performed perhaps the most complicated statistical maneuvers in his 1976 foray into political measurement. Testing legislative races in Oregon and California, Welch found that incumbency's re-elective power is more strongly related to an incumbent's privileges and high profile than it is to an incumbent's ability to raise more money. Incumbency's advantages, however, did not accrue greater value after one term, he said. He also found money gained no extra importance as district size increased and found money was more important in primary races than in general elections.[28]

Lawrence Shepard's 1977 examination of California congressional races found that the presence of an incumbent discourages contributions to challengers. Generally, he found spending to be the most important variable in determining outcomes.[29]

Another California study, by Owens and Olson (1977), found that spending, party strength and incumbency, respectively, were the most important factors in determining outcomes. Unlike Welch, they considered length of incumbency important. Finding that California incumbents outspent their opponents 70 percent of the time, they termed incumbency a "multidimensional phenomena." Incumbents can draw not only on money but on considerable political resources and benefit from a predisposition of some voters in favor of incumbents.[30]

Jacobsen (1978) found that money helped challengers more than it helped incumbents in congressional races.[31] Ruth S. Jones wrote in 1981 that public financing of campaigns in 17 states has not proven to be as helpful to incumbents as often was feared.[32]

Arrington and Ingalls studied local and legislative elections in the Charlotte, N.C. area. Their 1984 article contended money was more important in non-partisan races. Like Welch's ideas about primaries, this is not a surprising conclusion. Unless party makes no difference at all, removing it as a variable should make the remaining variables more important. They also found that incumbency was more important than money in multi-seat elections.[33]

We find, then, little in the way of consensus among investigators, different methods and test areas notwithstanding. If anything, the later studies seem to find stronger relationships between spending and percentage of vote. Inasmuch as none of them have looked at Washington (or used methods totally to the author's liking), we may safely conclude that our results will be as valid as any.

### III. The Washington Experience

Any quantitative study of a social science should be qualified as to its limitations. Obviously we cannot account for several important variables in a quantitative analysis of electoral outcomes. We are unlikely to find any effective way to measure such things as a candidate's personal qualities, campaign organization or the mood of the electorate. Hardworking, talented and experienced candidates have been known to win under all types of circumstances. The end result of this research must be production of a theory or equation that must be balanced by a convenient statement such as "other things being equal."

On the other hand, these numbers represent things that can be objectively measured. They must be given their due as much as the common wisdom deserves fair consideration.

#### 1. Test Background

Legislative races are the most likely candidates for a statistical analysis of this subject. They are numerous (more than 120 every two years) and, considerable data is available about the elections of 1974 and later. Because final figures for the 1984 elections were not available at the time the statistical portion of this project was being executed, elections from 1974 to 1982 comprised the test population. Choosing only elections contested by candidates from both the Republican and Democrat parties, and throwing out races where one candidate had no real chance of winning (particularly the Ellen Craswell -- Gordon Walgren 1980 Senate race, because Walgren was facing felony charges at the time and had little real chance of winning) leaves 508 cases on which to perform our machinations. The analysis also is limited to general election contests because of

the availability of easily collectible data. (Please see the Technical Appendix for a more detailed discussion of methods.)

Two different types of analysis were used. In the first set of tests, candidates' chances of winning and losing (the dependent variable) were individually measured against actual dollars spent in campaigns, relative percentage of dollars spent, type of candidate (incumbent or otherwise), political orientation of legislative district, number of contributors and relative percentage of contributors (the independent variables). The same tests were run again with percentage of vote substituted for winning and losing. In the second set of tests, multiple regressions were run using percentage of vote as the dependent variable, and the aforementioned characteristics, plus the opponent's level of experience, as the independent variables. Races were broken down into House and Senate races and into races involving incumbents and races considered open (in which no incumbent sought re-election).

The accuracy of the data must be considered while conducting this analysis. Although the power of the PDC and its attendant regulations are much stronger than pre-1974 campaign spending laws, these numbers are subject to some doubt. Campaigns usually include charges and countercharges of hidden spending. The PDC's budget constraints, which prevent extensive auditing, suggest hidden spending is highly possible (see Freed, Newmann and Sell, "Budgeting from the Chicken Coop," May 1984, for a more lengthy discussion of this).[34] The author's experience on the campaign trail suggests that hidden spending is not uncommon, though not in any significant proportion to reported



spending; it seems likely hidden spending balances out for each side in an actively contested race. (C. Montgomery Johnson has disagreed rather violently with this supposition.[35]) State law does not require candidates to report some types of in-kind contributions, such as labor donated at a rate of less than 20 hours per week. Democrats usually are expected to get more of this kind of help, which leads Republicans to complain that this kind of aid is not considered in debates over campaign finance laws.

Table 1 lists the distribution of candidates, district types and race types. Races designated "inumbent" include at least one candidate currently in the office being contested. "Previous" races include those in which at least one of the candidates has prior legislative experience but was not serving at the time of the election. "Open" races feature two candidates with no legislative experience between them. Candidate types follow the above definitions, while district types refer to the relative party strength within a district. A "Democrat" district is considered more solidly Democrat than is a "Democrat swing" district, and so on. Because Washington voters are not required to register by party, district type had to be calculated according to the opinions of legislative strategists of both parties.[36]

Table 1  
Distributions of Races, Candidates and Districts

	Type of Race	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Incumbent	396	78
Previous	17	3.3
Open	95	18.7
TOTAL	508	100

Races designated "Incumbent" include at least one candidate currently in the office in question. "Previous" indicates races in which no incumbent is running but in which at least one of the candidates previously has served in the Legislature. "Open" races feature two candidates with no experience between them.

	Type of Candidate	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Incumbent	405	39.9
Previous	29	2.9
Challenger	582	57.3
TOTAL	1016	100

Candidate types correspond to the race types described above.

	District Type	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Democrat	173	34.1
Democrat swing	86	16.9
Republican swing	98	19.3
Republican	151	29.7
TOTAL	508	100

District types refer to the predominance of voter identification within the district, as evidenced by non-legislative elections and opinion polling. The numbers above refer to the frequency of district types during the test period, 1974-1982. Washington state actually has only 49 legislative districts.

## 2. Preliminary Calculations

General tabulations of the data were conducted first so as to establish some boundaries for the research. These calculations revealed three likely influences on legislative campaign outcomes: incumbency, relative spending and relative contributions. (See Table 2.)

Incumbency (see Part I) long has been rumored to be a powerful force in electoral politics. For the test period, incumbents ran true to form, winning 86 percent of the time. The majority of the turnover in the Legislature, both House and Senate, came from incumbents retiring.

Figures on number of contributors were available only for 1978-1982. During this period, candidates who received more contributions than did their opponents won 80 percent of the time. Potential reasons for this relationship are not hard to find, though causality is hard to determine.

A larger number of contributions could be indicative of several things. This could be evidence of the candidate's great popularity in the district, if any significant portion of the contributions came from within the district. If a candidate gets numerous contributions from her or his district, it could be evidence of a lively, aggressive campaign. This will contribute to a candidate's chances of victory. A relatively larger number of contributions usually, though not always, means the candidate also will be able to spend more than his or her opponent.

Gathering more contributions appears to do more than just bring

Table 2  
Frequencies: winning versus incumbency, spending and number of contributors.

YEAR	CHAMBER	INCUMBENTS			SPENDERS			CONTRIBUTORS					
		WIN	LOSS	PERCENT	WIN	LOSS	PERCENT	WIN	LOSS	PERCENT	WIN	LOSS	PERCENT
1974	House	50	5	92	64	15	81	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	Senate	16	2	88	14	6	70	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1976	House	53	7	88	63	20	75	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	Senate	16	0	100	18	2	90	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1978	House	61	11	84	55	17	76	60	11	84	84	84	84
	Senate	13	2	86	12	7	63	16	3	84	84	84	84
1980	House	64	6	91	68	18	79	73	12	85	85	85	85
	Senate	11	7	61	12	8	60	14	6	70	70	70	70
1982	House	52	13	80	75	19	79	60	24	71	71	71	71
	Senate	15	1	93	15	7	68	18	4	81	81	81	81
TOTAL		361	54	86	396	119	76	241	60	80	80	80	80

This table measures the performance of incumbents, those who spent more than their opponents and those who collected a greater number of contributions than did their opponents. Incumbents are candidates who currently hold the office to which they are seeking re-election. "Spenders" are those candidates who spent more than did their opponents. "Contributors" are those who received a greater number of campaign contributions than did their opponents.

in more money. Although many observers have suggested money is useful because it may be substituted for active support, the reality of the relationship may be quite the opposite.[37] State Rep. J. Vander Stoep, R-Chehalis, one of the few legislators who accepts contributions only from within his district, suggests local contributions are very important in determining the outcome of a race.

When someone gives you a dollar they're yours for life in terms of political support. Instead of just deciding to vote for you, they're very likely to want to protect their investment. They're likely to work for you in some other way.[38]

Involvement may range from active campaign work such as doorbelling and envelope stuffing to putting up a yard sign and speaking favorably of the candidate to friends. Given some reputable theory about the role of "opinion leaders" in politics, the latter may be as important as any activity.

We should expect these variables to be related. Incumbents typically receive more money than do their opponents and a greater number of contributions usually means more money.

The question of the effect of more money is harder to answer. Those who spent more won 76 percent of the time. Simple arithmetic says at least some candidates who got more contributions but less money beat candidates who spent more money but received fewer contributions, though not in great numbers and certainly not a majority.

But does more money make better candidates, or do better candidates naturally get more money?

### 3. Further Connections

The Public Disclosure Commission's 1984 study found winners

spending more than losers, Republicans spending slightly more than Democrats and incumbents spending more than challengers. The figures do nothing to upset the common wisdom.

In the test population, winners averaged \$15,990 while losers were spending \$11,370. Relative spending was 65 percent and 35 percent for the two groups. Winners received contributions from an average of 237 persons, compared to 128 for losers. Incumbents actually spent less than winners (\$15,411 and 64.5 percent), while challengers spent slightly more than did losers (\$11,791 and 39 percent). Candidates with previous experience were a collective anomaly, averaging \$26,412 and 59.8 percent. Most candidates with previous experience are House incumbents seeking Senate seats, which typically are more expensive propositions.

Without controlling for other variables, a candidate's percentage of vote might just as well be explained by things other than money. Democrat candidates did best in predominately Democrat districts, not quite as well in Democrat swing districts and progressively worse in Republican swing and Republican districts. This pattern naturally reversed itself for Republican candidates. Similarly, incumbents of both parties average a higher percentage of votes than did previously experienced candidates or challengers. Oddly enough, for Republicans the relationship between district type and percentage of vote was stronger than the relationship between candidate type and percentage of vote, while for Democrats the reverse was true. Judging by the figures, it appears that Republicans are simply doomed in some districts while incumbency affords more protection for Democrats.

Table 3  
Breakdowns

District type, candidate type and percentage of spending by percentage of vote		
	Percent vote for Democrats	Percent vote for Republicans
District type		
Democrat	62.4	36.8
Democrat swing	53.7	48.9
Republican swing	48.9	51.1
Republican	41.7	57.8
R2	.399	.4189
Candidate type		
Incumbent	61.2	58.2
Previous	58.5	54
Challenger	43.5	41.5
R2	.4288	.3562
Percent spending		
<20	34.2	28.7
20-40	45.4	38.6
40-60	50.2	49.5
60-80	61.4	54
80<	70.8	65.5
R2	.6137	.6018

Percent vote represents the average vote received by a candidate of a given party in the situation indicated. District type represents relative party strength in a legislative district as indicated by a survey of party strategists. Under candidate type, incumbent represents candidates currently holding the office to which they seek election; previous candidates have held a seat in the House or Senate at some previous time; and challengers never have held office before. Percent spending represents the percent of money spent by one candidate relative to the money spent by the other. Thus if candidate A spent \$81 and candidate B spent \$19, A's spending would fall in the greater than 80 percent category. R2, or r-squared, is the percent of variation of the vote explained by applying the indicated variable. Thus, percent spending explains 61.37 percent of the variation of votes received by Democrat candidates.

The relationship between percentage of spending and percentage of vote was strong for candidates of both parties. Candidates who spent more relative to their opponents received a progressively greater percentage of the vote. The relationship was slightly stronger for Democrats than for Republicans.

These relationships can be used to explain the variation in percentage of vote received by each candidate ( $R^2$  in Table 3). Again without controlling for the effects of the other variables, percentage of spending explained the largest amount of variation, 61.3 percent for Democrats and 60.2 percent for Republicans. In contrast, candidate type explained 42.9 percent of the vote for Democrats and 35.6 percent for Republicans; district type explained 39.9 percent of the electoral variation among Democrats and 41.9 percent among Republicans. Actual spending and number of contributors showed very weak association with electoral performance, averaging about 7 percent for each party. It is noteworthy, however, that candidates for both parties who spent more than \$5,000 averaged more than 50 percent of the vote. Candidates who spent less than \$5,000 average 41.5 percent of the vote among Democrats and 35.7 percent among Republicans. Many observers have looked only at average spending and thus concluded one needs \$25,000 to \$30,000 to win an election. It would appear from this data, however, that the absolute floor is \$5,000 to \$10,000 (the lowest category for which the 50 percent vote figure was obtained), if one hopes to win an election. Without knowing what an opponent will spend, this may be a more useful figure.

Further associative calculations revealed strong relationships



between winning and losing and candidate type and a slightly weaker relationship between outcome and district type. (See Technical Appendix, Lambda and Gamma measurements.) For percentage of vote, however, percentage of spending displayed the strongest association among the variables.

Another anomaly in this calculation came among Republicans, for whom percentage of vote was strongly associated with both actual spending and number of contributors. These figures were not replicated at all among Democrats. Although these represent uncontrolled calculations, the data suggest Republicans not only rely more on money, they may be better at using it. Hayward and Foster each outlined different approaches to campaign spending for their respective parties. Foster listed such factors as the mood of the electorate, campaign organization and finding a candidate appropriate to the district type before naming money as a factor in electoral outcome, while Hayward listed only incumbency before money.

Foster said Democrats anticipate having less money and, in a well-run campaign, at least, they try to make do without it. Hayward, on the other hand, described money as essential to a successful campaign. This would suggest that Republicans have had at least more opportunity to use money and thereby opportunity to learn to use it well.[39]

#### 4. Controlled Analysis

It would be improper to draw conclusions about the test population without accounting for the effects of the independent variables on one another. Applying a systems analysis, as opposed to a

simple cause-and-effect analysis, one can easily imagine that each of the independent variables plays some part in determining the electoral outcome. The variables may have some effect on each other, or may, in effect, describe the same phenomenon and hence be redundant.

This latter condition proved to be true for percentage of contributors and percentage of spending, as they coincided in relative terms more than 80 percent of the time. The decision was then made to separately test each in conjunction with the other independent variables.

Three different calculations were run. Two included figures relating to contributions and involved elections from 1978-82 (the only years for which numbers on contributions were available). The third did not include contributions as a variable and covered elections from 1974-82.

In the first test, actual spending by both the winning and losing candidates, actual numbers of contributions for both, the relative experience of each candidate and the political orientation of the district were used to measure the variation in percentage of vote received by the Democrat in the race. (Choosing the candidate of one party over the other was not by design; selecting Republicans instead should produce a basically similar result. Multiple regressions run earlier in this project involving both parties produced essentially the same equation for Republicans and Democrats.) Each regression was run separately for House and for Senate contests. For House races, whether the candidate was an incumbent and district type mattered most. The actual amount of money spent by the two candidates was a relatively

insignificant factor. For Senate races, the results were remarkably similar, except that the experience of the opponent was more important than the candidate's own experience. Number of contributions mattered more than did actual spending, but again both numbers were relatively insignificant in explaining percentage of vote.

When percentages are substituted for actual numbers, the results change radically. (Percentage of contributions was chosen because it demonstrated a stronger relationship to percentage of vote than did percentage of spending.) Percentage of contributions explained by far the greatest amount of variation in percentage of vote, followed somewhat distantly by district type and experience, in both House and Senate races. Additionally, the overall equation produced a much better fit than did the equations involving actual spending and contributions.

The final regression, using percentage of spending and more electoral years, produced the same result although it was not divided by House and Senate races. Percentage of spending had the most influence on percentage of vote, with district type and experience having considerably less effect.

As mentioned above, Owens and Olson assumed actual time in office would be a better measure than would simple classification of candidates as incumbents, previous incumbents or challengers. Several regressions using actual years in the Legislature failed to find any truth to this supposition. It was not a better predictor of percentage of vote than was candidate type and in some cases was slightly worse.

Both percentage of spending and percentage of contributors

appeared to have much greater effect on percentage of vote than did the other variables. This relationship is displayed graphically in Figures 1-10, which are referred to as scattergrams. The vertical or Y-axis of each figure represents percentage of vote, while the horizontal or X-axis of each represents one of the independent variables, percentage of spending or contributions, actual spending and number of contributions. For percentage of spending and percentage of vote, and for percentage of contributions and percentage of vote, the points on the chart fall in a roughly linear pattern. This indicates that as percentage of spending or percentage of contributions increases, so does percentage of vote. For actual spending and contributions, the scatter patterns are decidedly not linear, indicating low correlation between the variables. For time served and percentage of vote, the pattern is slightly more linear but still nothing to write home about.

Some earlier regressions involving both parties touched on some potentially interesting differences between the two groups. For Democrats, actual spending consistently was more important than was number of contributors, while for Republicans quite the opposite was true. This suggests that a Republican who seeks more contributions may gain relative to a Democrat who does the same. The reason for this was touched on above: actively seeking contributions puts one in touch with more people. Democrats, who avowedly spend less, may be gaining this extra contact already. Conversely, Republicans may gain less from spending more because they already are spending more. Further spending serves only to demonstrate the concept of diminishing marginal returns.

## 5. Conclusions

Clearly, what is important about these results is the strength of relative numbers. It doesn't matter how much you spend (above a minimum level); what matters is how much you spend compared to what your opponent is spending. The popular analysis that \$25,000 to \$30,000 is necessary to win simply does not obtain. (See Table 4.) Although a Democrat candidate, for example, will have to spend proportionately less to win in a Democrat district, and will have to spend progressively more as the district becomes less Democrat and more Republican in constituency, what matters most is how much his or her opponent is spending. Similarly, on average, an incumbent won't have to spend as much as will a challenger, although data do not suggest challengers have to spend more in order to win. It suggests they need to be able to spend within the same range as do incumbents (plus or minus 10 percent) to have a chance at winning. Most probably, advantages in party strength and incumbency magnify and are magnified by advantages in spending. Chances of victory or defeat will fluctuate in large part by what the opponent manages to collect and spend. Certainly, a candidate who aggressively works her or his district to seek contributions will build a greater base of support and gain benefits that do not accrue to the candidate who relies chiefly on out-of-district contributions.

Table 4  
Distribution of spending for winning candidates

<u>Spending level</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<\$5,000	39	7.7
\$5-\$10,000	151	29.8
\$10-\$15,000	111	21.9
\$15-\$20,000	71	14.0
\$20,000<	<u>136</u>	<u>26.6</u>
TOTAL	<u>508</u>	<u>100</u>

Figure 1 - Percent of vote by percent of contributors, Democrats




Figure 1: Percentage of vote by percentage of contributions for Democrat candidates.

Figure 2 - Percent of vote by number of contributors, Democrats

SCATTERGRAM OF	(DUMM) N5	PERCENT OF VOTE	(ACROSS) N7	NUMBER OF CONTRIBUTORS
57.80	171.40	245.00	398.60	853.00
84.00			512.20	966.60
			739.40	1030.20
77.60				
71.20				
64.80				
58.40				
52.00				
45.60				
39.20				
32.80				
26.40				
20.00				
1.00	114.60	238.20	341.80	455.40
			569.00	682.60
			796.20	909.80
			1023.40	1137.00

Figure 2: Percentage of vote by number of contributors, Democrats.



Figure 4 - Percent of vote by number of contributors, Republicans.

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FREQUENCIES AND SCATTERGRAMS FOR PULDATA

FILE PDATA? (CREATION DATE = 11/12/84) Number of contributors.

SCATTERGRAM OF (DOWN) NS PERCENT OF VOTE (ACROSS) N7 NUMBER OF CONTRIBUTORS

42.70 126.10 209.50 292.90 376.30 459.70 543.10 626.50 709.90 793.30

80.00

73.60

67.20

60.80

54.40

48.00

41.60

35.20

28.80

22.40

16.00

1.00 84.40 167.80 251.20 334.60 418.00 501.40 584.80 668.20 751.60 835.00

Figure 4: Percentage of vote by number of contributors, Republicans.

Figure 3 - Percent of vote by percent of contributions, Republicans

FREQUENCIES AND SCATTERGRAMS FOR POLDATA									
11/28/84 PAGE 6									
Percentage of contributions.									
FILE	FDATA2	(CREATION DATE = 11/12/84)	PERCENT OF VOTE	(ACROSS) N5	PERCENT OF CONTRIBUTORS				
SCATTERGRAM OF	(DOWN) N5	.06	.16	.25	.35	.45	.55	.65	.75
80.00	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
73.60	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
67.20	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
60.80	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
54.40	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
48.00	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
41.60	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
35.20	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
28.80	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
22.40	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
16.00	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
.01	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I

Figure 3: Percentage of vote by percentage of contributions, Republicans.

Figure 5 - Percent of vote by percent of funding, Democrats

[illegible]

Percentage of	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
45.60	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
39.20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
32.80	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
26.40	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
20.00	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100

Figure 5: Percentage of vote by percentage of spending, Democrats.

Figure 6 - Percent of vote by actual spending, Democrats

FREQUENCIES AND SCATTERGRAMS FOR POLDATA												
Actual spending.												
(ACROSS) N3												
(DOWN) N5												
FILE	DATE	CREATION DATE	11/12/84	11/17/84	PAGE	2						
SCATTERGRAM OF	(DOWN) NS	3905.50	11716.50	19527.50	27338.50	35149.50	42960.50	50771.50	58582.50	66393.50	74204.50	
84.00	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
77.60	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
71.20	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
64.80	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
58.40	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
52.00	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
45.60	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
39.20	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
32.80	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
26.40	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
20.00	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	

Figure 6: Percentage of vote by actual spending, Democrats.

Figure 7 - Percent of vote by percent of spending, Republicans




Figure 7: Percentage of vote by percentage of spending, Republicans.

Figure 8 - Percent of vote by actual spending, Republicans

FREQUENCIES AND SCATTERGRAMS FOR POL DATA									
FILE: POLDATA2 (CREATION DATE = 11/12/84)									
SCATTERGRAM OF (DOWN) NS									
3711.45 11134.35 18557.25 25980.15 33403.05 40825.95 48248.85 55671.75 63094.65 70517.55									
80.00	+	*							
73.30	+	2	*						
66.60	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
59.90	+	2	*	*	*	*	*	*	
53.20	+	2	*	*	*	*	*	*	
46.50	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
39.80	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
33.10	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
26.40	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
19.70	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
13.00	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Percentage of vote by actual spending, Republicans									
80.00	+	*							
73.30	+	2	*						
66.60	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
59.90	+	2	*	*	*	*	*	*	
53.20	+	2	*	*	*	*	*	*	
46.50	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
39.80	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
33.10	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
26.40	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
19.70	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
13.00	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Percentage of vote by actual spending, Democrats									
80.00	+	*							
73.30	+	2	*						
66.60	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
59.90	+	2	*	*	*	*	*	*	
53.20	+	2	*	*	*	*	*	*	
46.50	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
39.80	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
33.10	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
26.40	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
19.70	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
13.00	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Percentage of vote by actual spending, Independents									
80.00	+	*							
73.30	+	2	*						
66.60	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
59.90	+	2	*	*	*	*	*	*	
53.20	+	2	*	*	*	*	*	*	
46.50	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
39.80	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
33.10	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
26.40	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
19.70	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
13.00	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	

Figure 8: Percentage of vote by actual spending, Republicans.

Number of years served in Legislature.

[illegible]

Figure 9: Percentage of vote by number of votes received in 1991 elections

[illegible]

REGULNCIES AND SCATTERGRAMS FOR POLDATA

FILE	PDAT2	(CREATION DATE = 4/ 4/85)	Number of years served in Legislature.	(DOWN) PERCENT	PERCENT OF VOTE FOR CANDIDATE	(ACROSS) SERVED	NUMBER OF YEARS SERVED IN LEGISLATURE			
SCATTERGRAM OF	1.00	3.00	5.00	7.00	9.00	11.00	13.00	15.00	17.00	19.00
80.00	+	*								
	I									
	I*									
	I									
	I									
73.30	+	*	2							
	I*	*	*							
	I	6	*		*					
	I	2	*		*					
	I	4	*		*					
66.60	+2	5	3	*		*				
	I	2	2		*					
	I*	3	2		*					
	I5	2	3	*	*					
	I3	*	*		2	*				
59.90	+2	7	2	*	*	*				
	I7	3	*		*	*				
	I4	5	3		*	*				
	I8	6	4	*	*	3				
53.20	+6	2	*		*	*				
	I5	2	*		*	*				
	I9	2	2		*	*				
	I9	3	2		*	*				
	I9	2	2		*	*				
46.50	+9	0	2							
	I9	*	*							
	I9	*	*		*	*				
	I9	*	*		*	*				
39.80	+4	*	*		*	*				
	I9	*	*		*	*				
	I9	*	*		*	*				
	I5	*	*		*	*				
33.10	+9	*	*							
	I9	*	*							
	I9	*	*							
	I4	*	*							
	I9	*	*							
26.40	+9	*	*							
	I2	*	*							
	I7	*	*							
	I4	*	*							
19.70	+2	*	*							

Figure 10: Percentage of vote for Republicans by number of years served in Legislature.

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#### IV. Campaign Spending: Some Thoughts on Policy

These results have two policy implications, involving what candidates need to do and what governments need to do. The coins of political expediency all come with two sides: politicians must spend money to get elected and, once elected, will feel some pressure to regulate their own behavior. It is a situation fraught with irony and contradiction. Recent events have only served to demonstrate that rational people will not do anything not in their own interest.

##### 1. Ode to Political Strategy

Although much of this research tends to corroborate the common wisdom, the line at the end of the ledger reads that parties would do best to try to match money and number of local contributions with their opponents. In nearly all of those cases where candidates have relatively equal amounts of money, each will have a fighting chance. In some solidly Democrat or Republican districts, comparable spending probably will only create a closer race but will not change the result. But in the swing districts, money can be put to great use.

Despite the common wisdom's support of factors that in our equations turn out to be no more than supporting players, surprisingly little attention is paid to them in actual campaign strategy. Although many individual campaigns appear to be run in a rational manner, the overall strategy of each party is lacking.

Each party is guilty of recruiting candidates based on ideology rather than on the nature of the district in which the candidate will run. "Both parties have had a tendency to try to recruit candidates based on philosophy rather than geographic reality," Foster said.[40]

Democrats sometimes have trouble dealing with conservative

members of their party, while the GOP's bane has been liberals. The net result has been lack of support for candidates who "fit" a district well and therefore had a better chance of winning. A former Republican party boss, in a secret meeting in the governor's office, spoke glowingly of an arch-conservative candidate for Congress. "We're going to run him against the liberals," he said, and he wasn't talking about Democrats.

This is not to place all the blame on party organizations. Sometimes the only available candidate is a true believer. In some instances the candidate has other positive qualities, such as desire, knowledge, public experience and reputation, that make him or her more desirable than other potential candidates. (And sometimes they win.) But in their initial recruiting of candidates, party organizations probably would benefit from being more broad-minded. When the presence of the candidate is a fait accompli, after a primary, for instance, the parties should be supportive, especially if the candidate seems to fit the district. Democrats seem more likely to decide they can finally knock a candidate out, particularly in heavily Republican districts, while Republicans seem to shy away from any strong monetary effort in heavily Democrat districts.

A second error is each party's failure to take full advantage of open seats. This is particularly surprising in light of so many participants' stated belief that incumbency is a dominant factor in elections. The only rational response to such a belief is to target campaigns in any district in which a seat becomes open (where no incumbent seeks re-election).

Parties do make careful lists and target races, though this process is much less scientific than one might expect. Targeting often occurs because someone with clout happens to like a certain candidate, or because one of the players talks the organization into supporting a particular candidate.

Lobbyists and PACs play a role in the selection process. Leaders of all four legislative caucuses semi-annually parade their candidates before the lobbyists and even make recommendations as to who should get money. In the words of House Speaker Wayne Ehlers, "If they're [the candidates] not performing, we tell lobbyists: 'Don't waste your time.'"[41] Certainly some good targeting decisions are made, but not enough. Targeting decisions should be made on the basis of a candidate's quality and on the basis of the nature of the seat and the district.

The final shortcoming of the state's political organizations is their failure to push local fundraising. The above evidence makes clear the importance of where money comes from; any rational candidate only can respond by working to gather more active support within the district. Conversely, if an opponent does not follow suit, the rational candidate must delicately make this an issue. (By delicately, I mean not like the way in which John Spellman made Booth Gardner's labor support an issue.) A creative candidate could develop many interesting and profitable ways to develop a local support network, such as "town hall" meetings and citizens' advisory groups.

## 2. Return to the Chicken Coop

As mentioned above, the Legislature is in an odd place in

relation to campaign financing, being faced with the curious chore of being the regulator of its own behavior. Although many of the participants have changed, the scenario under way with regards to limitations is not dissimilar to that which developed when the public disclosure laws were created. Debate was rampant and action minimal; in the end, a citizen initiative was offered to make sentiment into law.

As noted in Part I, the issue of campaign finance limitations has captured a lobe of the public conscience. In response, several campaign finance bills were introduced in the 1985 Legislature. Among them, three different (but not exclusive) approaches to campaign finance are identifiable.

Campaign finance laws basically are governed by a single 1974 U.S. Supreme Court decision, *Buckley v. Valeo*.<sup>[42]</sup> The court attempted to balance the competing needs of avoiding political corruption and of maintaining free speech and the right of political association. The court approved public disclosure requirements and limitations on the size of contributions. It ruled that overall campaign spending could only be limited in conjunction with some form of public financing. An individual's expenditure of personal funds cannot be limited, nor can expenditures by independent groups or persons in support of a candidate.<sup>[43]</sup> In a later decision, the court held that contributions from non-profit, unincorporated associations, such as medical or bar associations, may be limited. Corporations and unions may be prohibited from making any direct contributions.<sup>[44]</sup>

Although these decisions applied to federal election law, a

prudent person must assume they will form the framework of any state judicial review of campaign spending regulations. The bills offered in 1985 did fit within the court's framework.

Senate Bill 3307 would have limited individual contributions to candidates to \$1,000 for legislative candidates and \$3,000 for statewide candidates (such as candidates for governor). Senate Bill 3832 would have provided for public financing of state elections based on a matching program. Candidates would have been given the opportunity to sign a contract with the state, agreeing to limit their total spending in exchange for state matching money. Spending caps would have ranged from \$25,000 for state representative to \$1 million for governor. Of that \$25,000, the state would have provided \$10,000 under the matching program. The candidate's share would have to be gathered in contributions of \$100 or less. The first bill died on a 5-5 vote in the Senate Judiciary Committee, despite the presence of its prime sponsor, State Sen. Phil Talmadge, D-West Seattle, as committee chair. The latter bill received a hearing at which it was roundly denounced and hence did not come to a vote. If nothing else, the bill would have cost \$3.25 million had it been operative in 1984, according to one estimate.[45]

Although \$25,000 sounds like an adequate sum on which to campaign for the Legislature, anyone who committed to that level of spending would run the risk of facing an opponent who didn't and instead raised \$50,000 on his or her own. Unless the candidate disdains fundraising, the plan seems to offer little in the way of inducements to participate. Although the data do not specify what the result might be

at relative spending levels of \$50,000 and \$25,000, it seems a dicey proposition at best.

In the House, two noteworthy bills dealing directly with limits on contributions were introduced. House Bill 457 would have limited contributions to \$1,000 or 3 percent of a candidate's total take, whichever was greater. The creation of PDC Director Graham Johnson, the bill would have made candidates responsible for ensuring that their campaign finances met the restrictions of the bill. A candidate would have to avoid spending more than he or she could legally collect from contributors and, after an election, return the excess to the contributors or give it to the state. Perhaps the most creative approach recently offered in this state, the bill received some consideration in committee but did not come up for a vote. Ironically, a side-effect the bill might have been to increase the cost of campaigns, campaigns, because a bigger budget would allow one to accept bigger contributions.

Also competing in the Legislative arena was the Common Cause-backed House Bill 192. Common Cause's original intent was to limit contributions from within a district to \$250 per person and \$50 per person from outside of a district. Contributions from political party organizations would have been unlimited. When the bill was introduced, the out-of-district clause was dropped for political reasons.[46] After hearings, a substitute version of the bill was offered and passed by the committee on a nearly partisan vote. Democrats supported the bill and Republicans opposed it. Limits were set at \$1,500 for individuals and \$3,000 for party organizations and applied only to

legislative candidates. If a contribution is passed through an intermediary, such as a PAC, according to the bill, it would be counted as a contribution by both parties. Subdivisions, such as branch offices and union locals, would not be counted separately, so that a group could not double its contributions by simply splitting into two groups.

In response, House Republicans prepared a series of amendments to attach to the bill. These would have banned payroll deductions for PACs, prohibited political phone banks calls from outside of the state or legislative district, strengthened accounting and disclosure requirements for independent campaigns (in support of a candidate) and limited use of voter registration lists.[47]

The net result of these efforts was to reduce the debate to partisan terms. Republicans spend more in House races (though slightly less in Senate races) and, on the average, get larger individual contributions than do Democrats, so that limits on the size of contributions would affect Republicans more than Democrats. Conversely, in 1985 majority Democrats passed a bill allowing public employees to make payroll deductions for political purposes, so that a ban on such deductions conceivably could hurt Democrats more than Republicans. Phone banks and independent mailings also have played a larger part in Democrat campaigns. Over a period of three days, all of the substantive amendments were defeated. In a very curious episode, Republicans nearly succeeding in amending the bill to lower the contribution level from \$1,500 to \$250. The amendment, while appearing quite progressive, was essentially punitive. A majority could not have

been found to pass a bill that limited contributions to such a small figure, for whatever reasons.

Whether the bill or anything like it could work probably hinges on its ability to actually increase the number of campaign contributors and not simply encourage the funneling of campaign funds through more outlets. Opponents of this approach have claimed business and labor say they will seek ways to get around any such restrictions. Supporters seem to feel the law could be made strong enough to prevent this from happening.[48]

Perhaps more instructive as to the desirability of campaign finance limitations are some of the arguments made against the various bills. State Sen. Kent Pullen, R-Kent, claimed that the increase in spending was justified because of population increases, even though the state's voter rolls have not increased 260 percent in the 10 years we have had disclosure.[49] In the House, business and labor lined up against HB 192. Mark Brown of the Washington Federation of State Employees argued that limitations would cause a proliferation of PACs that would drown his members' ability to compete in the political arena.[50] Association of Washington Businesses (AWB's board controls United for Washington, the state's largest PAC in terms of contributions) spokesman Michael Hodge told the House Constitutions, Elections and Ethics Committee that campaign spending limits would limit businesses' ability to compete as well:

Business has no opportunity to turn out the manpower like other political factions can. Because of our personpower constraints we have to compensate through the monetary side. That's the most reasonable way we can do it. We can't turn out people in numbers



that organized factions can. Business people by nature are busy making a living.[51]

Sauvage was predictably unimpressed with these criticisms: "I think our bill's pretty good when business and labor get together and say 'This thing stinks.'"[52]

The Common Cause position is that politics and government will be better served if more people are involved in the process, in part because elected officials will be beholden to more people than they are now. Ostensibly, campaign contribution limits would help achieve this. The experience of other states can be examined in this light.

Among other states, 16 have limits on direct corporate contributions; 20 ban them altogether and seven prohibit use of corporate funds for establishment or operation of PACs. Another 19 states limit direct union contributions and nine states prohibit them entirely. Twenty states limit contributions by PACs; 23 states limit individual contributions. Only 11 states, including Washington, do not limit individual contributions. Washington, in fact, has no limits of any kind. Every state except North Dakota has some kind of public disclosure law.

Common Cause claims the result of contribution limits has been to increase the number of contributors. A survey of other states conducted by the office of state Rep. Dick Barnes, R-Burien-Des Moines, found a general level of dissatisfaction with campaign finance limitations in 18 states that have them, particularly among party personnel. With the exception of Montana, the overall estimation was that limits had not decreased the cost of campaigns nor had they curbed

the influence of people with lots of money. Minnesota now has almost 400 PACs and more than 300 political committees. Kansas has 500 PACs. Although Barnes' report claimed Washington has only 50 PACs, actually it has 203 registered PACs. This still considerably less than Kansas or Minnesota. Loopholes in the laws of many other states allow considerable amounts of money to be raised and spent on campaigns. Michigan, for instance, has PACs for 60 chambers of commerce and for 50 United Auto Workers locals. Loopholes such as these would be avoided by SHB 192, but they do lend some credence to the argument that ways around any campaign contribution law will be found. Barnes' overall conclusion was that limitations had not helped challengers, had not increased individual participation in campaigns and did not decrease the cost of campaigns. Montana was the great exception in this group; each Montana House district has only 7,000 people in it and campaigns average about \$3,000 per candidate. The other states averaged \$30,000 to \$40,000 per campaign.[53]

Opponents, chiefly Republicans, have decried the exclusion of in-kind contributions in figuring political spending. Labor performed at a rate of less than 20 hours a week does not have to be reported. Unfortunately, we have no good numbers on how much this labor might be worth, though it is assumed to be more important to Democrats than to Republicans. Although some candidates do not report, at least some assign a monetary value to donated labor and report it to inflate the apparent size of their war chests. This tactic appears to be used to make campaigns look financially healthier in hopes of attracting more monetary contributions.

Another common complaint, almost always cited by incumbents, is that challengers will be hurt by finance limitations because they need to spend more money than incumbents to win. As mentioned above, this dictum is not supported by the numbers. A calculation involving that particular situation displayed only a very weak relationship between percentage of spending and percentage of vote.

The final argument against limits on contributions, mentioned briefly above, seeks to place such regulations on par with Prohibition. The problem with limitations, several opponents claim, is that they will push underground that which now is ostensibly aboveboard. As Hayward put it, "If a big contributor wants to get somebody a large amount of money, they'll find a way. Why not keep it out in the open?"[54] Given the paltry budget usually accorded the Public Disclosure Commission, this appears to be a legitimate concern. Claims of cheating are not widespread, but because the PDC lacks staff to perform field audits, the opportunity for cheating is tremendous. Our public disclosure laws, in recent years, have been reduced to operating on the honor system.

Early on, Sauvage said his group was dissatisfied with SHB 192. After all the debate and posturing, the 1985 Legislature produced bills to limit campaign contributions to less than \$5,000 in the last 21 days of a campaign (affecting appreciably less than 5 percent of all contributions) and allowing the PDC to levy larger fines. Common Cause responded by drafting an initiative to the Legislature (Initiative 88). For legislative candidates (it also addressed gubernatorial races) the measure prescribed contribution limits of \$500 from PACs, individuals,

unions, corporations and any organization other than political parties, which can give \$3,000, including local, county and state units. Loans would be considered contributions under this proposal. It also attempts to control transfer of funds between candidates and organizations, though it appears to make less effort to limit proliferation of organizations, one of the strongest arguments against limitations. The initiative should create some fireworks for 1986, though the U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled the size of PAC contributions cannot be limited.[55] Common Cause's response was not known at this writing. As an initiative to the Legislature (should it gain the 152,000 required signatures), it will force the Legislature to pass it, or see it placed on the 1986 ballot along with any alternatives legislators may dream up. Out of such a cloudbank did the public disclosure law emerge in 1972. A good time should be had by all.[56]

### 3. Weighing Options Before Anchors

Many of the arguments against campaign finance limitations are not as trenchant as they first appear, yet neither are many of the claims in their favor. Limitations on spending do not appear to unduly hurt the chances of challengers. They do appear to create a greater number of contributors, though sometimes in ways that appear less than beneficent.

It is patently obvious that a person who contributes money to a candidate will have more influence with that candidate than will a person who gives no money, even if all the contributor buys is access. As a necessary but insufficient condition, money also clearly plays a

significant if not major role in determining who wins elections. Clearly, the electoral economy cannot be allowed to operate on a laissez faire basis.

We may take some actions to militate against the dangers of political corruption and to control for the influence of money over elections without resorting to campaign finance limitations. These may or may not be sufficient to meet the well-founded concerns of critics such as Sauvage, but they are at least workable.

Although opponents of campaign financing like to point out that our state's system works on the basis of public disclosure, the truth of the matter is somewhat different. The impact of public disclosure has not been very great because it's not very public. Aside from occasional newspaper reports (more frequent during campaigns), the public side of campaign finance disclosure is minimal. What we have instead is the Dixy Lee Ray approach, in which the information is available for anyone who wants to look at it but little or no effort is made to publicize it. We would be better served if the PDC could audit more campaigns and if it had more ability to publish its results. This could range from regular reports mailed to media outlets across the state to including some form of the disclosure reports as part of the state voter's pamphlet. This latter course would be guaranteed to raise more than a few hackles.

A second reform would require any campaign that spends more than \$25,000 to submit an independent audit of the campaign's books within a specified time after each primary and general election. Penalties should be established for late reports as well. To date the

commission's approach has been to levy fines as a last resort; we would be better served if they were less forgiving.

Common Cause's initiative would be a mixed blessing. On one level, it would limit the monetary power of some large organizations, but it also likely would do some other things. The number of organizations would grow, which tends to lead to more, not less, money in campaigns. Although Sauvage basically argues this diffusion of power is a good thing, I have seen political consultants sharpen their teeth in anticipation of all the new PACs they will be paid for organizing. Whether this is a fair tradeoff or a beautiful but lame horse must be a matter of personal judgment. I would prefer to see Common Cause put more effort into putting some muscle into the PDC.

Our decision on campaign finance limitations must be made on the basis of whether the advantages will outweigh the disadvantages. I do not think the answer to this question is at all clear. What seems most likely is that money makes a big difference in elections and that limiting contributions and/or spending would radically alter the nature of electoral politics in Washington state. Let us hang the banner of caution in a prominent place.

## Appendix: Adventures in Statistics

### 1. Looking for Mr. Goodnumber

All of the statistical work on this subject seems to have only one thing in common: each investigator pursued an entirely different statistical course. Each seemed to have a particular rationale for his or her method and punctuated this with criticism of the work of previous researchers. Some of the criticisms were valid and some seemed somewhat specious. Despite the varying approaches,  $R^2$  values were remarkably similar for almost all of the research.  $R^2$  typically fell in a range of .60 to about .90, with congressional races usually obtaining the higher scores.

Spending, party strength and incumbency were generally agreed upon as the three variables to be measured; disagreement came on how the variables are to be measured. Most of the investigators opted for percentage of spending. Jacobson (1978) preferred using actual spending for each candidate in an election because, he said, the coefficients of the two figures are not expected to be the same. I disagreed with this supposition simply because not using percentile numbers totally ignores the complementary effects of the relative levels of spending. Owens and Olson (1977) and Arrington and Ingalls (1984) agreed specifically on this point.

The author's only coup was to use percentage of contributions as a variable. This in itself presents some curious problems. Although in the test data percentage of contributions was multicollinear with percentage of spending (and hence the two could not be used together), it is not a perfect match. Therefore percentage of contributions is not a true measure of spending and represents a statistical distortion

of the real effect of money. Whether it is a statistically significant distortion, I cannot say; perhaps some way around this problem exists.

Unfortunately, the author's statistical ability has not yet developed to the point of investigating some of the more interesting approaches suggested by some of the researchers. Owens and Olson (1974) offered path analysis as one way of being more certain of causality. They did determine that expenditures were the strongest factor in predicting electoral outcomes.

Perhaps the area of greatest diversity in among the methods of regression. Many researchers opted for simple least squares regression (basically what was used for this project), while others claimed this technique is not sophisticated enough for the data. Welch (1976), for instance preferred to convert his numbers to semi-log form, after applying the economic law of diminishing marginal returns to political spending and rationally deducing that the money-vote line should be curvilinear. Jacobson later argued that Welch's idea was correct but tended to underestimate the increase in percentage of vote gained by challengers at higher levels of spending. Jacobson instead calls for two-stage regression.

Despite all the machinations, the results remain remarkably similar, or at least not dissimilar enough to provoke any great surprise. Table 5 lists the  $R^2$  values for several of my regressions. Table 6 lists the Gamma and Lambda measurements taken during preliminary work on the project.



Table 5  
R2 Values for Various Regressions

<u>Regressions</u>	<u>R2</u>
Variation in percentage of vote as explained by actual spending, actual contributions, district type and candidate experience.	
House races, 1978-1982.....	.68
Senate races, 1978-1982.....	.67
Variation in percentage of vote as explained by percentage of spending, district type and candidate experience.	
All races, 1974-1982.....	.77
Variation in percentage of vote as explained by percentage of contributions, district type and candidate experience.	
House races, 1978-1982.....	.79
Senate races, 1978-1982.....	.77

The variation in this chart refers to the different results achieved by different candidates.

Table 6  
Lambda and Gamma measurements for selected variables

	<u>Democrats</u>		<u>Republicans</u>	
	<u>Lambda</u>	<u>Gamma</u>	<u>Lambda</u>	<u>Gamma</u>
1.	.27948	NA	.19737	NA
2.	.40175	NA	.39912	NA
3.	.62009	NA	.56410	NA
4.	.48908	NA	.48246	NA
5.	.06987	NA	.30702	NA
6.	.04575	NA	.04545	NA

Win/loss by actual spending (1), percentage spending, (2) candidate type (3), district type (4), number of contributors (5) and percentage of contributors (6).

1.	.09091	.20958	.14481	.43085
2.	.29144	.80024	.27596	.80229
3.	.17647	NA	.11749	NA
4.	.17112	NA	Missing	NA
5.	.05348	NA	.08743	.46035
6.	.14224	-.04669	.11062	.03326

Percentage of vote by actual spending (1), percentage spending, (2) candidate type (3), district type (4), number of contributors (5) and percentage of contributors (6).

## 2. Parameters

From one viewpoint, the uncertainties surrounding some of the figures used in performing this research cast doubt upon the results. From another viewpoint, however, the numbers are as concrete a source of information as we are likely to get; it is not too difficult to assume that the vagaries of reporting tend to balance out. Rather than provide definitive answers, the statistics can provide us with a different though certainly not exclusive way of looking at elections.

One chief difference between this and most other statistical analyses of politics is in the use of the test population. Most research with which the author is familiar involves single election years. Elections were aggregated for this research; the small number of Senate races in each election year would seem to invite results that could be skewed by a couple of extraordinary cases.

Future research obviously could include elections years since 1974-82. The accuracy of the numbers will remain a problem, however, until the PDC is able to enforce reporting requirements more strictly. I do not think it is a widespread problem but it is a potential one that should be of some concern to those who regard themselves as advocates of good government.

Another problem, as mentioned above, is how candidates report different items. Candidates do not have to report in-kind contributions, though some do in the interest of making their war chests appear better endowed. Potential donors are said to look down upon underfunded campaigns. Candidates also do not have to report donations of less than \$25; again, some do and thus appear to have more support.

It is the author's feeling that a candidate who takes the time to do this probably is running the kind of locally active campaign that earlier was identified earlier as a key to success.

All data for this research were taken from reports published by the Public Disclosure Commission and the Secretary of State, with the exception of 1974 data, which were taken from the Common Cause study of that year. The PDC uses this data in its calculations as well. Spending calculations were made on the basis of reported expenditures, again except for 1974, when calculations are made on the bases of reported receipts. The differences between the two figures are assumed to be small, based on experience with figures from the following years.

Most research in this area pays attention only to percentage of vote as the dependent variable. Although probably this is because as a dependent variable, win/loss is nominal, restricting analysis involving this variable to bivariate correlations. The interval-level variable percentage of vote was available for both bivariate correlations and for multivariate regression. The author found it useful to pursue the simpler measurements as groundwork for the multiple regressions; the differences in results for the two parties were particularly instructive.

Another statistical briar patch is district type. As mentioned above, voters do not register by party in this state, a fact that causes many staunch partisans no little consternation. The Secretary of State does not collect voting data by legislative district, however, so that measuring party strength by other-than-legislative races also is lost as an option. The party organizations do claim some of this

knowledge, however, so that our measurements of party strength may be better than they appear at first glance. The party organizations claim to rely on the results of both legislative and statewide races and on the results of surveys. While the result is profile that is not as reliable as one would hope, it is not hopeless. Interestingly, very little disagreement was found in the Democrat and Republican lists. I think the variable is too important to be ignored, in any case.

Tables 7 through 11 feature the final, untranslated results of the major regressions run for this study. Tables 7 and 8 involve percentage of vote measured against percentage of contributions, district type and candidate experience for House and Senate races, respectively, using cases from 1978-82. Tables 9 and 10 substitute actual spending and contributions for percentage of contributions, again for House and Senate races. Table 11 uses percentage of spending and involves cases from 1974-82.

## Notes on Regressions

### Tables 7-11

Tables 7 through 11 are the regressions as described in Section III. All regressions were performed using Democrats as the subject candidates; earlier testing with Republicans found results that were essentially the same.

Tables 7 and 9 are for House races; tables 8 and 10 are for Senate races and table 11 is for all races. The dependent variable in each regression is percentage of vote received by the test candidates (listed as PERCVOT1 in some of the tables).

The variables are coded because of limitations in the text entry portion of the SPSS statistical program. PERCONT is relative percentage of contributions and PERCS represents relative level of expenditures. ACTS1 and 2 represent the amount spent by the candidate and by the opponent, respectively. CONTRIB1 and 2 refer to the actual number of contributions received by each. These were entered as interval-level variables.

D1, D2 and D3 refer to the experience level of the candidate: D1 refers to incumbents, D2 to candidates who previously served in the Legislature and D3 is for candidates with no experience. DX1, 2 and 3 refer to the opponent's level of experience and correspond to the notation for the test candidates' levels of experience. DD1, 2, 3 and 4 refer to political orientation of the district. DD1 represents Democrat districts; DD2 stands for swing Democrat districts; DD3 is the designation for swing Republican districts; and DD4 designates solid Republican districts. These variables were all entered as dummy variables.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE.. PERCVOT1 PERCENT OF VOTE FOR CANDIDATE 1

Table 7 SUMMARY TABLE

VARIABLE	MULTIPLE R	R SQUARE	RSD CHANGE	SIMPLE R	B	BETA
PERCVOT1	.83705	.70065	.70065	.83705	28.04227	.56748
DD4	.86368	.74595	.04530	-.56863	-4.312770	-.14763
DJ	.87637	.76802	.02207	.66821	3.564545	.13208
DD1	.88209	.77808	.01007	.61762	4.044601	.14385
DX3	.88535	.78384	.00575	.54589	4.577303	.16442
DD2	.88577	.78459	.00075	.03533	1.311610	.03609
DX1	.88599	.78498	.00039	-.53811	2.195171	-.07807
D2	.88607	.78512	.00014	-.00326	-1.287681	-.01199
(CONSTANT)					30.76307	

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

5/ 1/85

PAGE 8

TRANSFORMATIONS REQUIRED.. 1300 BYTES  
 13 TRANSFORMATIONS  
 0 RECODE VALUES + LAG VARIABLES  
 69 JF/COMPUTE OPERATIONS

CPU TIME REQUIRED.. 2.53 SECONDS

23 \*SELECT IF (CHAMFER2 AND YEAR GT 76)  
 24 REGRESSION VARIABLES=PERCVOT1, D1 TO D3, PERCVOT1,  
 25 DX1 TO DX3, DD1 TO DD4/  
 26 REGRESSION=PERCVOT1 WITH D1 TO D3,  
 27 PERCVOT1, DX1 TO DX3, DD1 TO DD4/  
 28 STATISTICS ALL

\*\*\*\*\* REGRESSION PROGRAM REQUIRES 3072 BYTES WORKSPACE, NOT INCLUDING RESIDUALS \*\*\*\*\*

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

5/ 1/85

PAGE 9

SPSS NOW CONTAINS A NEW REGRESSION PROCEDURE.  
 SEE CHAPTER 3, PAGES 94-121 OF THE SPSS RELEASE 7-9 UPDATE MANUAL.  
 NEW REGRESSION WILL REPLACE THIS (OLD) REGRESSION PROCEDURE IN THE NEXT RELEASE.

VARIABLE Table 8

	MULTIPLE R	R SQUARE	RSD CHANGE	SIMPLE R	R	BETA
PERCENT1						
DX3	.84242	.70968	.70968	.84242	29.97230	.57580
DD1	.85776	.73576	.02608	.69551	4.556932	.18244
D2	.86646	.75075	.01499	.59058	4.004088	.15231
DD4	.87372	.76338	.01264	.14722	3.993549	.11538
DX1	.87589	.76719	.00381	-.44519	-1.777031	-.06467
D3	.87600	.76737	.00019	-.59164	-.5396058	-.02076
(CONSTANT)	.87603	.76743	.00005	-.63110	-.3150491	-.01183
					32.92690	

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

5/ 1/85 PAGE 14

TRANSPACE REQUIRED.. 100 BYTES  
 1 TRANSFORMATIONS  
 0 RECODE VALUES + LAG VARIABLES  
 7 IF/COMPUTE OPERATIONS

CPU TIME REQUIRED.. 1.22 SECONDS

29 FINISH

NORMAL END OF JOB.  
 29 CONTROL CARDS WERE PROCESSED.  
 0 ERRORS WERE DETECTED.

# VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLE	B	BETA	STD ERROR B	F	VARIABLE	BETA IN	PARTIAL	TOLERANCE	F
D1	5.180388	.19149	4.10357	1.5094	D2	999999.99999	99999.99999	.00000	99999.999
DD1	6.206007	.22050	1.66570	13.0931	DD3	999999.99999	99999.99999	.00000	99999.999
DD4	5.232457	.17898	1.51647	11.9005					
DX3	-4.914434	.17635	7.66856	.411					
CONTRJ1	.1491811F-01	.14001	.00589	6.417					
ACTS2	.2001056E-03	.20253	.00006	10.348					
ACTS1	.2308825F-03	.16025	.00009	6.914					
DD2	1.651057	.04542	1.70858	.934					
CONTRJ2	.3657820F-02	.08524	.00261	1.964					
DX2	-13.17598	.08714	9.44541	1.946					
DX1	-9.929827	.35281	7.55254	1.729					
D3	-1.390222	.05157	4.04600	.118					
(CONSTANT)	52.85584								

F-LEVEL OR TOLERANCE-LEVEL INSUFFICIENT FOR FURTHER COMPUTATION

STATISTICS WHICH CANNOT BE COMPUTED ARE PRINTED AS ALL NINES.

Table 9  
MULTIPLE REGRESSION

FILE PROJDATA (CREATION DATE = 5/1/85)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE.. PERCVOT1 PERCENT OF VOTE FOR CANDIDATE 1  
MULTIPLE REGRESSION  
5/1/85 PAGE 7

## SUMMARY TABLE

VARIABLE	MULTIPLE R	R SQUARE	RSD CHANGE	SIMPLE R	B	BETA
D1	.66900	.44756	.44756	.66900	5.180388	.19149
DD1	.74204	.55063	.10307	.61896	6.206007	.22050
DD4	.77158	.59533	.04470	.56860	5.232457	.17898
DX3	.78575	.61740	.02207	.54591	4.914434	.17635
CONTRJ1	.79894	.63833	.02093	.45298	.1491811F-01	.14001
ACTS2	.81290	.66080	.02249	.27712	.2001056E-03	.20253
ACTS1	.82110	.67421	.01343	.27839	.2308825F-03	.16025
DD2	.82171	.67521	.00100	.03573	1.651057	.04542
CONTRJ2	.82215	.67592	.00071	.20647	.3657820F-02	.08524
DX2	.82242	.67637	.00044	.01389	-13.17598	.08714
DX1	.82384	.67873	.00235	.53810	-9.929827	.35281
D3	.82394	.67887	.00016	.66582	-1.390222	.05157
(CONSTANT)					52.85584	

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

5/1/85

PAGE 8



Table 10

## MULTIPLE REGRESSION

FILE PRODATA (CREATION DATE = 5/ 1/85)

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\*\*\*\*\* MULTIPLE REGRESSION \*\*\*\*\* VARIABLE LIST 1  
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE.. PERCVOT1 PERCENT OF VOTE FOR CANDIDATE 1 REGRESSION LIST 1

## SUMMARY TABLE

VARIABLE	MULTIPLE R	R SQUARE	RSQ CHANGE	STMPLE R	B	BETA
DX3	.69551	.48373	.48373	.69551	9.001130	.36036
DD1	.74669	.55755	.07382	.59058	9.317244	.35442
D2	.78020	.60871	.05115	.14722	5.947938	.17185
DD2	.79969	.63950	.03080	.09303	3.441812	.10377
D3	.80391	.64627	.00677	-.63110	-2.635219	-.09895
CONTRIB2	.80804	.65292	.00665	-.48244	-1.768028E-01	-.22483
CONTRIB3	.81370	.66211	.00919	.27530	.5523620F-02	.08982
ACTS2	.81650	.66667	.00456	-.32581	.8386353E-04	.12527
DD4	.81701	.66751	.00084	-.44519	-1.097860	-.03996
(CONSTANT)					45.03455	

## MULTIPLE REGRESSION

5/ 1/85 PAGE 14

TRANSPACE REQUIRED.. 100 BYTES

1 TRANSFORMATIONS  
 0 RECODE VALUES + 148 VARIABLES  
 7 IF/COMPUTE OPERATIONS

CPU TIME REQUIRED.. 1.60 SECONDS

29 REGRESSION      VARIABLES=PERCS1, D3 TO D3, DD1 TO DD4,  
 30                    DX1 TO DX3, PERCVOT1/  
 31                    REGRESSION=PERCVOT1 WITH PERCS1, D3 TO D3.  
 32                    DX1 TO DX3, DD1 TO DD4/  
 33 STATISTICS      ALL

Table 11

## MULTIPLE REGRESSION

5/ 1/85 PAGE 19

FILE PROJDATA (CREATION DATE = 5/ 1/85)

\*\*\*\*\* MULTIPLE REGRESSION \*\*\*\*\*  
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE.. PERCVOT1 PERCENT OF VOTE FOR CANDIDATE 1  
 VARIABEL LIST 1  
 REGRESSION LIST 1

## SUMMARY TABLE

VARIABLE	MULTIPLE R	R SQUARE	RSQ CHANGE	SIMPLE R	B	BETA
PERCSJ	.80804	.65293	.65293	.80804	.2856748	.52522
DX3	.84694	.71731	.06438	.59978	7.673500	.27920
DX4	.86195	.74295	.02564	.65063	-4.918532	-.18661
DX1	.87119	.75894	.01601	.52619	-4.425971	-.15350
DX2	.87379	.76351	.00455	.57021	1.620233	.05826
DX7	.87451	.76477	.00125	.11497	-1.575067	-.04716
DX1	.87454	.76482	.00006	-.07512	3.215969	.03706
DX1	.87463	.76497	.00015	-.58014	2.555390	.09123
DX1	.87465	.76502	.00005	.62423	-5077879	-.01923
(CONSTANT)					35.68022	

## MULTIPLE REGRESSION

5/ 1/85 PAGE 20

CPU TIME REQUIRED.. 2.02 SECONDS

34 FINISH

NORMAL END OF JOB.

34 CONTROL CARDS WERE PROCESSED.

0 ERRORS WERE DETECTED.

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3. Austin Ranney, speech to House of Representatives staff, November 1984.
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5. Beatrice Kay, Victory in the Voting Booth, (Palm Springs: ETC Publications, 1981) p. 142.
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8. State Rep. Pat Fiske, interview with the author, Olympia, WA. August 1983.
9. This point also may be inferred from the many comments of consultants on the importance of media to a successful campaign; media isn't free.
10. Johnson, op cit.
11. Hayward, op. cit.
12. The Increased Cost of Legislative Campaigns: 1974 to 1984, (Olympia: Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, 1984) pp. 15-21.
13. Foster, op. cit.
14. Hayward, op. cit.
15. Lucy Gaskill, Campaign Finance: An Analysis of Interest Group Behavior in Washington State, (Olympia: Public Disclosure Commission, 1979) passim.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.; Chuck Sauvage, interview with the author, Olympia, WA., Nov. 27, 1984.
18. Ibid.

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25. Gaskill, op. cit., p. 1.
26. Public Disclosure Commission, op. cit.
27. William F. Lott and P.D. Warner, Quality and Quantity, No. 8, 1974, pp. 99-106, cited in John R. Owens and Edward C. Olson, "Campaign Spending and the Electoral Process in California, 1966-1974," Western Political Quarterly, December 1977, p. 495.
28. W.P. Welch, "The Effectiveness of Expenditures in State Legislative Races," American Politics Quarterly, July 1976, pp. 335-356.
29. Lawrence Shepard, "Does Campaign Spending Really Matter," Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1977, pp. 196-205.
30. Owens and Olson, op. cit., pp. 493-512.
31. Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, June 1978, pp. 469-492.
32. Ruth S. Jones, "State Public Campaign Finance: Implications for Partisan Politics," American Journal of Political Science, May 1981, pp. 342-361.
33. Theodore S. Arrington and Gerald S. Ingalls, "Effects of Campaign Spending on Local Elections: The Charlotte Case," American Politics Quarterly, January 1984, pp. 117-127.
34. Christine Freed, Rachel Newmann and T.M. Sell, "Budgeting from the Chicken Coop: The Problems of the Public Disclosure Commission," unpublished ms., May 1984.

35. Johnson, op. cit.
36. Hayward, op. cit. and Foster, op. cit.
37. Herbert E. Alexander, one of the leading scholars in the field of political finance, has made this point in several of his books, most notably Financing Politics, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980).
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43. Rick Shattuck, "Election Contributions and Expenditures," memo to the Washington State House Constitution, Elections and Ethics Committee, Sept. 13, 1983, pp. 1-2.
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50. Mark Brown, interview with the author, Olympia, WA, February 1985.
51. Michael Hodge, interview with the author, Olympia, WA, February 1985.
52. Sauvage, interview with the author, Olympia, WA, February 1985.

53. Sylvia Barnes, "State Campaign Contribution Laws," unpublished ms., April 1985.

54. Hayward, interview with the author, February 1985.

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56. Bob Partlow, "Common Cause take initiative on campaign reform," The Olympian, March 6, 1985.

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NOTE: Every attempt has been made to make citations and references as accurate as possible. Many of the newspaper articles were culled from a press clipping service so that, unfortunately, exact page numbers were not available. A considerable portion of this information is gleaned from the author's personal observations as a reporter and as an employee of the House of Representatives. In these instances no citation or reference has been made. It should also be noted that the conclusions herein are mine and are not intended to reflect the opinion or position of the PDC, any political party or any other person or organization I have been involved with during this project.

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